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needed order and respect for the judicial system, Congressional action
seems imperative. It is submitted that Congress should, in addition to
scrupulously abstaining from the future use of the word "maintained"
without a clear cut definition, reword Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to dispel all of the current confusion which has attached
to the problem of whether suits brought in state courts under the
F. L. S. A. are removable to federal district courts or not. The
F. L. S. A. is certain to come under Congressional scrutiny in connec-
tion with the now famous portal to portal question 42 and such a re-
wording of Section 16(b) could be advantageously accomplished at the
same time. A workable standard may be found in the eighth sentence
of Section 28 of the Judicial Code3 which permits removal of suits
against common carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act 44 only
when they involve more than $3,000. This would provide sufficient fed-
eral decisions to which state courts could look for guidance thereby
avoiding too many jurisdictional inconsistencies.
NOEL R. S. WOODHOUSE.
Insurance--Extension of Coverage by Waiver or Estoppel
Plaintiff insurer sought a declaratory judgment to- determine its li-
ability on an automobile liability policy. The policy contained the fol-
lowing: "This policy does not apply: (a) while the automobile is used
as a public or livery conveyance. . . ." There was also a clause limiting
the agent's power with respect to waiver and estoppel. Answering two
issues submitted to it, the jury found (1) the automobile was used as
a public conveyance, and (2) the agent knew it was to be so used when
he issued the policy. Defendant abandoned a plea for reformation. The
trial court disregarded the second issue and gave judgment for plaintiff.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the submission of the
second issue was inadvertent as it rested upon parol evidence which
Ky. 1943). See comment note 13 supra on these two cases. Barron v. F. H. E.
Oil Co., 4 Wage & Hour Rep. 551 (W. D. Tex. 1941). Contra: Harris v. Reno
Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943). See also cases listed in note 41 infra.
" Cases denying removal are listed first. Apple v. Shulman Publications, 65
F. Supp. 677 (D. N. J. 1943). Contra: Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) (really a dictum, however, cited both pro and con
often). Duval v. Protes, 51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943). Contra: Ellems
v. Helmers, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y. 1944). Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F.
Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). Contra: McCarrigle v. 11 W. Forty Second
St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). In each of these cases the judges
were different and in the later of the two in each district the judge did not bother
to distinguish or overrule the previous contra decisions.
'2 N. Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, §E, p. 3, col. 3.
4136 STAT. 1094 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
"41 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq.
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varies the terms of the written agreement; and the first issue established
exclusion from liability.'
This case raises several questions of interest, an exhaustive analysis
of which is beyond the scope of this note. They may, however, be
briefly reckoned with. The first question is, What effect does a clause
against waiver of policy provisions have on waivers which otherwise
would result from that which leads to the issuance of a policy?
Provisions in an insurance policy which restrict the power of an
agent relative to waiver do not become operative until the policy is
issued.2 Such provisions are a part of the contract, and it logically
follows that they can have no operative effect until the policy issues.
Thus, they can only apply to something which comes into existence after
the inception of the contract. Restrictive provisions in the policy can
have no effect upon what took place before the policy issued.3 The cases
supporting these rules are, for the most part, cases involving waiver of
conditions, the breach or nonexistence of which would forfeit the policy.
There is a dearth of cases applying these rules to situations where an
insurer issues a policy with knowlodge of conditions which would ren-
der the policy merely ineffective for the purpose intended, rather than
forfeited. But certainly no one could reasonably contend that the an-
nounced rules do not apply to the latter situation. To do so would be
to assume that the insurer did not intend to execute a valid, effective
contract embodying the intentions of the parties.4 Also, failure to apply
the rules to such situations would give the insurer a legal license to
perpetrate fraud on the insured, in view of the known fact that few
persons read their policies.
The second question to be briefly examined is, Should the parol evi-
dence rule operate to preclude the admission of evidence of the nego-
tiations preceding issuance of a policy? Parol evidence is admissible
where it is sought to reform an instrument,3 or to show fraud in con-
nection therewith.6 Insurance policies can be reformed by parol evi-
dence for mistake of one superinduced by fraud or inequitable conduct
of the other.7 The argument in the foregoing paragraph is equally
Insurance Co. v. Wells, 226 N. C. 574, 39 S. E. (2d) 741 (1946).
2 Smith v. Insurance Co., 208 N. C. 99, 179 S. E. 457 (1935) ; Case v. Ewbanks,
194 N. C. 775, 140 S. E. 709 (1927); Aldridge v. Insurance Co., 194 N. C. 683,
140 S. E. 706 (1927); Bullard v. Insurance Co., 189 N. C. 34, 126 S. E. 179
(1925) ; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916) ; VANCE,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §126 (". . . limitations contained in the policy could
have no effect as to transactions prior to the delivery of the policy ... ).
2 16 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACricE (1944) §9101; VANCE, IN-
SUR.ANCE (2d ed. 1930) §126.
'English v. Casualty Co., 138 Ohio St. 166, 34 N. E. (2d) 31 (1941).
'Hubbard v. Home, 203 N. C. 205, 163 S. E. 347 (1932) (mistake, fraud,
surprise and accident furnish exceptions to the general rule).
6 Trust Co. v. Knight, 160 N. C. 592, 76 S. E. 623 (1912).
'Williams v. Insurance Co., 209. N. C. 765, 185 S. E. 21 (1936).
(Vol. 25
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applicable here; i.e., to allow an insurer to issue a policy with knowledge
of facts rendering it ineffective for the purpose intended works a fraud
on the insured. Since this is, in effect, a fraud on the insured, or at all
events the evidence of estoppel in such a situation is evidence of in-
equitable conduct, and parol evidence is admissible where reformation
is sought, such evidence should be allowed to show the insurer's knowl-
edge when the policy was issued." And this should be, even though
the plea for reformation is abandoned, as in the principal case, because
the court may grant any relief consistent with the facts pleaded.9 Fur-
ther, estoppel serves the same purpose in law as reformation does in
equity. Since law and equity are combined under the code, there can
be no valid reason to exclude parol evidence. The decision in the prin-
cipal case places the insurer in an advantageous position. An unscru-
pulous company may issue a policy which it knows will not cover the
risk intended. When loss occurs, it can bring suit for declaratory judg-
ment on the policy, and if the insured does not ask for ieformation,
the company escapes all liability. It retains the premiums for which it
has given no consideration. And this is the result even though an
equitable remedy, declaratory judgment, is sought.
The final question, and the principal one to be considered is, Should
the law allow the coverage of an insurance policy to be extended by
waiver or estoppel? By waiver is meant implied waiver; it is assumed
that express waiver upon consideration is a contract itself and presents
no problem. The problem of extension of risk comes before the court
when there is involved in a suit an insurance policy containing condi-
tions and/or exceptions. The distinction between conditions and ex-
ceptions is not always clear. A provision is clearly a condition when
it provides that upon a certain occurrence the policy will be void. An
exception withdraws from coverage a risk which the insurer does not
wish to assume. An exception always involves a risk while a condition
may or may not involve a risk.10
According to some authorities, the general rule in the United States
is that neither waiver nor estoppel can create a contract of insurance or
so apply as to bring within the coverage of the policy property or a loss
or risk, which by the terms of the policy is excepted or otherwise ex-
cluded." An examination of the cases cited by these authorities in
I Midkiff and Brannock v. Insurance Co., 197 N. C. 139, 147 S. E. 812 (1929) ;
Gerringer v. Insurance Co., 133 N. C. 407, 45 S. E. 773 (1903); Strause v. In-
surance Co., 128 N. C. 64, 38 S. E. 256 (1901) ; see Johnson and Stroud v. Insur-
ance Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916); VAxcF, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930)
§136, note 86.
McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §401.
" VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §116 (distinction drawn between war-
ranties, conditions and exceptions, and illustrated).
11
RICHARDS, THE LAW OF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) §115; 29 Am. Jur., In-
surance §801 ("However, the doctrine of implied waiver or of estoppel is not
19471
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support of the proposition discloses the inherent weakness of the gen-
eralization.1 2  Still, many cases have quoted this "general rule" with
approval.' 3 But these cases reveal only the instability of the doctrine
and a considerable amount of confusion attending it.14  And the conclu-
sion is warranted that the cases do not support the doctrine that insur-
ance coverage is not to be extended by waiver or estoppel. In fact,
analysis of the cases supports the opposite conclusion as to estoppel.
Although it is apparent that whether extension will be allowed is
largely dependent upon the facts of each case, some reasonably accurate
generalizations may be made. Those cases which declare that waiver or
estoppel will not extend coverage ordinarily are those in which the in-
surance policy has a field of operation beyond the risk not covered, and
conditions occur which render the policy merely inoperative as distin-
guished from void or a nullity.15 This result is supportable on the
available to bring within the coverage of a policy risks not covered by its terms or
risks expressly excluded therefrom.); id. §903; 45 C. J. S., Insurance §674; note
(1939) 38 MIcH. L. REv. 104 (1939).
2 To illustrate, the following cases are cited in 29 Am. Jur., Insurance §903,
footnote 2: Miller v. Banker's Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R.
378 (1919) (elements of wiaver not present) ; Norton v. Catholic Order of For-
esters, 138 Iowa 464, 114 N. W. 893, 24 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1030 (1908) (elements
of waiver not present, estoppel not considered); Ridgeway v. Modern Woodmen,
98 Kan. 240, 157 Pac. 1191, L. R. A. 1917A, 1062 (1916) (facts did not constitute
waiver, general rule supported only by inference); Bower & Kaufman v. Both-
well, 152 Md. 392, 136 AtI. 892, 52 A. L. R. 158 (1927) (general rule suppoited
only as to estoppel, waiver must have consideration); Washington Nat. Ins. Co.
v. Craddock, 130 Tex. 251, 109 S. W. (2d) 165, 113 A. L. R. 854 (1937) (sup-
ports general rule as to waiver, not clear on estoppel) ; Rosenthal v. Insurance
Co., 158 Wis. 550, 149 N. W. 155, L. R. A. 1915B 361, Ann. Cas. 1916E 395 (1914)
(supports general rule as to waiver but by dictum, evidence of waiver weak);
McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N. W. 697, 47 L. R. A. 681 (1896)
(supports general rule).
"* Carnes v. Assurance Corp., 101 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Insurance
Co. v. Roberts, 132 F. (2d) 798 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Insurance Co. v. Raper,
242 Ala. 440, 6 So. (2d) 513 (1941) ; Assurance Soc. v. Langford, 234 Ala. 681,
176 So. 609 (1937) ; Insurance Co. v. Motor Co., 227 Ala. 449, 150 So. 486 (1933) ;
Insurance Co. v. Smith, 200 Ark. 508, 139 So. (2d) 411 (1940); Quillion v.
Assurance Soc., 61 Ga. App. 138, 6 S. E. (2d) 108 (1939); Insurance Co. v.
Eviston, 110 Ind. App. 143, 37 N. E. (2d) 310 (1941); Richardson v. Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 228 Iowa 319, 291 N. W. 408 (1940) ; Pierce v. Life Ass'n, 223 Iowa
211, 272 N. W. 543 (1937) ; Insurance Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 Atl.
838 (1934) ; Carew v. Casualty Co., 189 Wash. 329, 65 P. (2d) 689 (1939) ; Mc-
Coy v. Northwestern Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N. W. 697, 47 L. R. A. 681 (1896).
C% Referring to the cases cited supra note 13:
In Insurance Co. v. Raper, the court cited the case of Insurance Co. v. Schar-
nagel, 227 Ala. 60, 148 So. 596 (1933) which held that denial of liability on an-
other ground estops the company from setting up exception as defense. In
Assurance Soc. v. Langford, the court said, ". . . a ground on which payment may
be resisted may be waived." In Insurance Co. 'v. Motor Co., Insurance Co. v.
Scharnagel, supra, is again cited. In Insurance Co. v. Smith, elements of estoppel
were lacking. In Richardson v. Tray. Men's Ass'n, the question of estoppel was
not involved. In Carew v. Casualty Co., support of the rule was by dictum. In
McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, a weak case of estoppel is made out.
"Fidelity & Guar. Corp. v. Bilquist, 99 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
Insurance Co. v. Raper, 242 Ala. 440, 6 So. (2d) 513 (1941); Insurance Co. v.
Smith, 200 Ark. 508, 139 S. W. (2d) 411 (1940) ; Quillion v. Assurance Soc., 61
Ga. App. 138, 6 S. E. (2d) 108 (1939) ; Ridgeway v. Modern Woodmen, 98 Kan.
[Vol. 25
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ground that the insured received some protection as consideration for
his premiums since the policy was merely suspended during the occur-
rence of the excluded risk, and would become effective again upon
cessation of that condition. However, in the cases so holding, elements
of estoppel have been totally lacking or very weak. Therefore, in most
of the cases where the courts have said coverage cannot be extended by
waiver or estoppel, the word "estoppel" has been dictum.
Undoubtedly a majority of the courts will allow extension of cover-
age by estoppel. 16 Most of the cases deal with a situation where, under
a policy of liability insurance, the insurer defends the action against the
insured and is thereafter held estopped to deny liability on the policy.
Although the courts do not mention extending the coverage, it is none-
theless true that that is the result accomplished.
This note is not concerned with the technical distinctions between
waiver and estoppel, but with extension by one or the other or both.
240, 157 Pac. 1191, L. R. A. 1917A 1062 (1916); Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co.,
179 La. 779, 155 So. 22 (1934); cf. Quinones v. Life and Cas. Co., 209 La. 76,
24 So. (2d) 270 (1945) ; Insurance Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 AtI. 838
(1934); Ruddock v. Insurance Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920); Cas-
ualty Co. v. Adams, 159 Miss. 88, 131 So. 544 (1931) ; Rosenberg v. Assurance Co.,
246 S. W. 1009 (Mo. App. 1922); Craddock v. Insurance Co., 130 Tex. 251, 109
S. W. (2d) 165; 113 A. L. R. 854 (1937); Two Rivers Co. v. Casualty Co., 168
Wis. 96, 169 N. W. 291 (1918) ; McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66
N. W. 697, 47 L. R. A. 681 (1896) ; anno. 113 A. L. R. 857.
" Claverie v. Casualty Co., 76 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Assurance
Corp. v. Chicago and B. M. Co., 141 Fed. 965 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905); Assurance
Soc. v. Langford, 242 Ala. 440, 176 So. 609 (1937) ; Indemnity Ass'n v. Supply
Co., 211 Ala. 84, 99 So. 787 (1924) ; Knights v. Shoaf, 166 Ind. 367, 77 N. E. 738
(1906) ; Conner v. Insurance Co., 122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P. (2d) 863 (1932) ; In-
surance Co. v. White, 106 Ind. App. 530, 19 N. E. (2d) 872 (1939) ; Palumbro v.
Insurance Co., 293 Mass. 35, 199 N. E. 335 (1935) ; Lunt v. Insurance Co., 261
Mass. 469, 159 N. E. 461 (1928) (by implication) ; Leverett v. Casualty Co., 247
Mich. 172, 225 N. W. 515 (1929) (distinguished from Ruddock v. Insurance Co.,
209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920) on ground that estoppel occurred before
loss); Humphrey v. Polski, 161 Minn. 61, 200 N. W. 812 (1924) (by implica-
tion); Mann v. Assurance Corp., 123 Minn. 305, 143 N. W. 794 (1913); Tozer
v. Accident and Guar. Co., 94 Minn. 478, 103 N. W. 509 (1905), affd on appeal,
99 Minn. 290, 109 N. W. 410 (1906); Cowell v. Indemnity Corp., 326 Mo. 1103,
34 S. W. (2d) 705 (1930) ; Keck v. Insurance Co., 237 Mo. App. 308, 167 S. W.
(2d) 664 (1942) ; Rieger v. Guaranty and Acc. Co., 202 Mo. App. 184, 215 S. W. 920
(1919); Royle v. Casualty Co., 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S. W. 438 (1912), former
appeal, 126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907); Fairbanks v. Guaranty and
Acc. Co., 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911); Lipe v. Insurance Co., 142
Neb. 22, 5 N. W. (2d) 95 (1942) ; Moore v. Fidelity and Guar., Co., 293 N. Y.
119, 56 N. E. (2d) 74 (1944) ; Gerka v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 251 N. Y. 51, 167
N. E. 169 (1929) ; Draper v. Relief Ass'n, 190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907) ;
Early v. Insurance Co., 224 N. C. 172, 29 S. E. (2d) 558 (1944); Fidelity and
Cas. Co. v. Blausey, 49 Ohio App. 556, 197 N. E. 385 (1934); Humes Const. Co.
v. Casualty Co., 32 R. I. 246, 79 At. 1, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 906 (1911) ; Ellis v.
Casualty Co., 187 S. C. 162, 197 S. E. 510 (1938); Ziegler v. Ryan, 66 S. D. 491,
285 N. W. 875 (1939) ; Mancini v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A. (2d) 105 (1943) ;
Beatty v. Assurance Corp., 106 Vt. 216, 168 At. 919 (1933); Lumber Co. v. In-
surance Co., 159 Wis. 627, 150 N. W. 991 (1915) (by implication); see Hargett
v. Insurance Co., 12 Cal. App. (2d) 449,55 P. (2d) 1258, 1261 (1938). 16 APPLE-
MAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1944) §9090, note 35; CooLEY's BRIEls ON
INsuINcE (2d ed. 1927) Vol. 5, p. 393.
1947]
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However, it may be pointed out that there are cases which declare that
extension is not to be accomplished by waiver while it may be by
estoppel.' 7 On the other hand, there are cases which declare that either
or both waiver and estopel may be invoked to prevent injustice.' 8 In
Fairbanks Canning Co. v. London Guar. and Acc. Co.,1' where the in-
surer defended an action against the insured, pursuant to a clause in a
liability policy, with full knowledge of facts upon which it could deny
coverage, the court said: "Such action is sometimes said to constitute
estoppel in pais; sometimes it is denominated an election of position
which cannot afterwards be changed; sometimes it is said to be a con-
temporaneous construction of the contract by the party claimed to be
bound; and yet again it is called a waiver. But in whatever way it may
be designated it is such conduct on the part of the insurer as will cut him
out of a defense he might have made. . . ." And in Delaware Ins. Co.
v. Wallace,"0 where the policy contained a provision limiting coverage
to property only while in a specified place, the court said: "There may
be waiver of such provision, estoppel to assert it, or agreements affect-
ing it. . . ." Further, there are those cases where waiver alone has
been pleaded and coverage has been extended. 21 Cases often arise where
the policy sued on contains a provision relating to coverage as distin-
guished from cases where the policy in question, by necessary inference
only, does not cover the particular loss. To avoid an inequitable and
obviously unjust result which would occur if extension were not al-
lowed, but confronted with the contention that coverage may not be
extended by waiver or estoppel, the courts call such provisions, pro-
visions for the benefit of the insurer which may be waived, 22 an accepted
27 Claverie v. Casualty Co., 76 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Indemnity
Ass'n v. Supply Co., 211 Ala. 84, 99 So. 787 (1924); Conner v. Insurance Co.,
122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P. (2d) 863 (1932) ; Knights v. Shoaf, 166 Ind. 367, 77 N. E.
738 (1906) ; Insurance Co. v. White, 106 Ind. App. 530, 19 N. E. (2d) 872 (1939) ;
Palumbro v. Insurance Co., 293 Mass. 35, 199 N. E. 335 (1935) ; Keck v. Insur-
ance Co., 237 Mo. App. 308, 167 S. W. (2d) 664 (1942) ; Draper v. Relief Ass'n,
190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907) ; Mancini v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A. (2d)
105 (1943) ; Beatty v. Assurance Corp., 106 Vt. 216, 168 Atl. 919 (1933).
18Insurance Co. v. Scharnagel, 227 Ala. 60, 148 So. 596 (1933) ; Leverett v.
Casualty Co., 247 Mich. 172, 225 N. W. 515 (1929); Rieger v. Guaranty and
Acc. Co., 202 Mo. App. 184, 215 S. W. 920 (1919); Fairbanks v. Guaranty and
Acc. Co., 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911); Royle v. Casualty Co., 126
Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907), aff'd on appeal, 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S. W.
438 (1912); Myton v. Casualty Co., 117 Mo. App. 442, 92 S. W. 1194 (1906);
Lipe v. Insurance Co., 142 Neb. 22, 5 N. W. (2d) 95 (1942) (action was to re-
cover premiums paid on policy which excluded from coverage any one over 65,
recovery denied because insurer waived age requirement and "waiver" ripened into
"estoppel").
" 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911).
" 160 S. W. 1130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
" Casualty Co. v. Aarons, 85 Colo. 591, 277 Pac. 811 (1929) ; Insurance Co. v.
Ransdell, 259 Ky. 559, 82 S. W. (2d) 820 (1935); Barker v. Insurance Co., 52
S. W. (2d) 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
22 Quinones v. Insurance Co., 209 La. 76, 24 So. (2d) 270 (1945) (military
clause).
[vol.5
1947] NOTES AND COMMENTS 215
risk subject to a condition subsequent,23 a promissory warranty.2 4 By
so doing, each court has extended coverage without discussing the issue
or even mentioning it.
Turning now to North Carolina, in Johnson and Stroud v. R. I.
Insurance Co.,25 a policy was issued on a building in process of erection.
The policy excepted liability if the building was not enclosed and under
roof. The court said, by way of dictum, that if the insurer issued the
policy knowing of conditions existing at the time, it could not thereafter
avoid liability on account of those conditions. Thus, had loss occurred
before the building was enclosed, coverage would be extended. In
Midkiff and Brannock v. Insurance Co.26 a fire policy excepted liability
while explosives were kept on the premises. Loss occurred while ex-
plosives were kept. The court said: "Conditions with respect to the
property insured . . . existing at the time the policy was issued, ...
cannot be relied upon to defeat liability under the policy. When the
policy was issued with such knowledge, it will be held that the company
has waived the breach of the stipulations and provisions contained
therein, which would otherwise render the policy void at its inception."
The provision was not a condition working a forfeiture, as the court
seemed to consider it, but was clearly an exception to liability. The
keeping of explosives was material to the risk. So here extension was
allowed. In Early v. Insurance Co.27 it was said, by way of dictum,
that the objection that liability is not within the terms of the policy may
be waived. The case of Royle Mining Co. v. Fidelity and Cas. C0.2 8
was cited which held that defense by the insurer of an action brought
against the insured, by a third party, constituted waiver of an exception
and estopped the insurer from thereafter asserting it. In McCabe et al.
v. Casualty Co.2 9 it was held that a provision in an accident policy lim-
iting coverage to persons 18 to 65 years could not be waived. However,
in that case the policy provided for a return of premiums to persons over
65, and this undoubtedly influenced the court's decision. Thus, it is seen
that in North Carolina extension of coverage by waiver or estoppel is
possible and has been allowed.
Extension of insurance coverage by waiver and/or estoppel should
be allowed in proper cases. To do so merely accomplishes the purpose
for which these doctrines were introduced into the law. 0
CLAuDE, F. SEILA.
"* Keistler Co. v. Insurance Co., 124 S. C. 32, 117 S. E. 70 (1923) (clause pro-
viding for non-liability if building collapses except as result of fire).
2"Colby v. Insurance Co., 134 Me. 18, 181 Atl. 13 (1935) (clause providing
for non-liability if car used without permission).
-5172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916).
2"1197 N. C. 139, 147 S. E. 812 (1929).
'224 N. C. 172, 29 S. E. (2d) 558 (1944).
2s126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907).
"209 N. C. 577, 183 S. E. 743 (1936)."0 Humes Const. Co. v. Philadelphia Cas. Co., 32 R. I. 246, 79 Atl. 1, Ann. Cas.
